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Monuments to the Confederacy and the Right to 
Destroy in Cultural-Property Law 
abstract.  This Note identiﬁes problems in cultural-property law that the recent wave of 
removals of Confederate memorials has illustrated. Because cultural-property law’s internal logic 
tends inexorably towards supporting preservation, it has no conceptual framework for recognizing 
when a culture might be justiﬁed in destroying its own cultural property. I argue that destruction 
of cultural property can, in some cases, serve values that the preservationist impulse of cultural-
property law has overlooked. I propose a new regime for cultural-property law that permits de-
struction in cases where the monument in question was established in celebration of a violation of 
the customary international law of human rights. 
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introduction 
On June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof entered the Emanuel African Methodist Epis-
copal Church and shot twelve black congregants, killing nine.
1
 News outlets 
promptly uncovered photographs of Roof visiting Confederate heritage sites and 
waving the Confederate ﬂag while holding a gun. The grisly massacre triggered 
protests and debates across the nation—with many demanding the removal of 
the symbols that seemed to have provided the inspiration for Roof’s acts. As 
commentators reevaluated the meaning and appropriateness of their display in 
public places and at public expense, many concluded that it was time for these 
monuments to be taken down or destroyed. 
Amidst mass protests and heated controversy, Confederate memorials began 
to come down. After New Orleans’s city council voted to remove the city’s four 
Confederate monuments, following a lawsuit and a heated public debate,
2
 the 
statues were removed in the middle of the night by workers wearing ﬂak jackets 
and scarves to conceal their identities for their safety.
3
 In Durham, without the 
sanction of the county, protestors smashed a statue of a Confederate soldier that 
stood outside the county’s courthouse.
4
 
As public debate on the monuments raged on, little reference was made to 
the body of law governing art, architecture, and statuary in the United States. 
Although public monuments are protected by a web of international-, federal-, 
and state-level law, these laws seemed to provide little guidance for establishing 
the appropriateness of removing or destroying monuments. 
The controversy over monuments to the Confederacy thus reveals a major 
lacuna in the framework of cultural-property law: the lack of a theoretical frame-
work for dealing with the permissible destruction of cultural property. As such, 
a city, state, or municipality making a decision about a contested monument will 
ﬁnd the law unhelpful. 
 
1. Adam K. Raymond, A Running List of Confederate Monuments Removed Across the Country, N.Y. 
MAG. (Aug. 25, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/08/running-list-of 
-Confederate-monuments-that-have-been-removed.html [https://perma.cc/Z334-W2TE]. 
2. Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F. Supp. 3d 573 (E.D. La. 2016). 
3. Richard Fausset, Tempers Flare over Removal of Confederate Statues in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/us/new-orleans-monuments.html 
[https://perma.cc/DUP3-ZMSQ]; Christopher Mele, New Orleans Begins Removing Confed-
erate Monuments, Under Police Guard, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/04/24/us/new-orleans-Confederate-statue.html [https://perma.cc/V3WZ-APLH]. 
4. Maggie Astor, Protesters in Durham Topple a Confederate Monument, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/protesters-in-durham-topple-a-Confederate 
-monument.html [https://perma.cc/H5F2-TE4U]. 
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Modern cultural-property law emerged in the wake of the destruction and 
looting that followed World War II.
5
 Because cultural-property law’s original 
purpose was to address the potential for wartime destruction of the world’s 
treasures, its organizing principle is the preservation of historically or aestheti-
cally signiﬁcant heritage. As such, domestic and international cultural-property 
law has given little consideration to the question of whether a nation is ever jus-
tiﬁed in destroying its own cultural heritage. The logic of cultural-property law 
presses inexorably toward preservation. 
But what cultural-property law fails to recognize is that the destruction of 
cultural property may promote important values. Destruction grabs headlines 
and inspires uniquely strong reactions. It promotes expressive values that cannot 
be equally realized through preservation. In the case of a victimized group, de-
struction of the victimizer’s cultural property can realize powerful cathartic val-
ues. Alternatively, a group may wish to destroy certain objects to expressively 
disown the values memorialized by the works. These values are recognized in 
American law in varying ways under the First Amendment and under the com-
mon law of property,
6
 but they collide directly with the preservationist impulse 
of cultural-heritage law. 
In this Note, I argue that cultural-heritage law should recognize a limited 
right to destroy cultural property. A government should be permitted to destroy 
its cultural property, but only when that property was established in celebration 
of a violation of the customary international law of human rights. This approach 
recognizes the values served by destruction without casting aside the valuable 
protection that cultural-heritage law has afforded historically and aesthetically 
important art and architecture. 
Part I sets out the background for this theory: historically, cultural-property 
law developed in response to widely deplored acts of destruction. As a result, the 
law orients itself around the value of preservation. However, cultural-property 
law has not meaningfully considered either why preservation is valuable or what 
deserves legal protection. It has also not considered when the destruction of cul-
tural property might be warranted or desirable. 
Part II points out the ﬂaws of such a regime. I argue that important expres-
sive and cathartic values can be served through the converse of cultural-property 
law’s core value: destruction. I then examine some of the most commonly offered 
alternatives to destruction and conclude that a community could reasonably pre-
fer destruction over these alternatives in some cases. 
 
5. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Carstens, The Hostilities-Occupation Dichotomy and Cultural Property in 
Non-International Armed Conﬂicts, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 16-17 (2016). 
6. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 788-89, 824 (2005). 
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In Part III, I propose a new regime for cultural-property law that permits 
destruction in certain cases. Given cultural-property law’s links to human rights 
law, nations should be permitted to destroy monuments that were established to 
celebrate violations of the customary international law of human rights. 
i .  preservation as cultural-property law’s core value  
Consider a memorial such as the Nathan Bedford Forrest Monument, which 
stood in the center of Memphis until recently. Such a monument is protected by 
an interlocking web of domestic and international cultural-heritage legal provi-
sions. On the international level, the 1954 Hague Convention requires states to 
preserve “movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural 
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, 
whether religious or secular.”
7
 Domestically, the Forrest Monument was pro-
tected by the Veterans’ Memorial Preservation and Recognition Act of 2003 
(VMPRA),
8
 which penalizes anyone who “willfully injures or destroys, or at-
tempts to injure or destroy, any structure, plaque, statue, or other monument on 
public property commemorating the service of any person or persons in the 
armed forces of the United States.”
9
 Being listed on the National Register of 
Historic Places,
10
 the Forrest Monument would have had certain additional pro-
 
7. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conﬂict art. 1(a), 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. The 1954 Hague Con-
vention does not contain an enforcement mechanism. The Convention only requires that the 
parties “undertake to take, within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all 
necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, 
of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Con-
vention.” Id. art. 28. Even if the treaties did allow for enforcement actions in an international 
tribunal, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the judgments of such tribunals when adjudi-
cating treaties are entitled only to “respectful consideration” by U.S. courts. Breard v. Greene, 
523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). The enforcement mechanism contemplated by the trea-
ties for breach of duty is sanctions—but it goes without saying that, in the face of serious 
geopolitical considerations, the United States is likely to face little pushback from the global 
community for the destruction of Confederate memorials. The treaty does represent a com-
mitment, however, even if it is not a legally enforceable one. 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1369 (2018). 
9. Id. § 1369(a). 
10. Ryan Poe, Memphis Haunted by Long, Conﬂicting History with Confederate Monuments, COM. 
APPEAL (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:14 PM CT), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news 
/government/city/2017/08/15/memphis-confederate-monuments-through-years/568801001 
[https://perma.cc/E2RN-MG2Y] (noting that in 2009, “[t]he Forrest Camp of the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans succeed[ed] in quietly adding Forrest Park to the National Register of 




 And because Tennessee had passed a statute forbidding the removal 
of any statue from state property,
12
 Memphis could not legally remove the statue 
under state law.
13
 Memphis ultimately removed its Forrest Monument through 
a clever work-around, transferring the park in which it stood to a nonproﬁt.
14
 
However, litigation continues before the Tennessee Historical Commission, with 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans suing to restore the monuments.
15
 
The many protections accorded to the Monument raise the question of how 
cultural property has developed to the point where so many safeguards are af-
forded to Confederate memorials. Forrest’s legacy is highly contested,
16
 and 
there may be valid reasons why a city such as Memphis that owns and displays 
his statue on public land and at public expense might wish to remove or destroy 
the statue. Yet cultural-property law does not consider this possibility, instead 
providing only a variety of protections—protections that render the removal or 
destruction of such a statue difficult and probably illegal. Relatedly, cultural-
property law provides protections in a value-neutral way. Once something is de-
termined to be cultural property, the law assumes that it is worthy of protection. 
But as the Forrest example shows, that assumption may not be correct at all 
times. 
This Part provides an overview of the interlocking domestic and interna-
tional safeguards that protect Confederate memorials today. It further argues 
that underlying all of these laws is a preservationist ethos. Because cultural-
property law developed through ad hoc responses to widely deplored acts of de-
struction of cultural property, the laws and treaty regimes currently in place are 
oriented toward requiring governments to protect cultural property. This preser-
vationist ethos pervades both the law and theory of cultural property, including 
 
Historic Places, temporarily sidelining efforts to rename the park and remove its monument 
and graves”). 
11. See, e.g., Jessica Owley & Jess Phelps, Understanding the Complicated Landscape of Civil War 
Monuments, 93 IND. L.J. SUPP. 15, 29-32 (2018). 
12. Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412. 
13. See, e.g., Owley & Phelps, supra note 11, at 31. 
14. Ryan Poe, How Memphis Took Down Its Confederate Statues, COM. APPEAL (Dec. 28, 2017, 5:51 
PM CT), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/government/city/2017/12/28
/how-memphis-took-down-its-confederate-statues/984895001 [https://perma.cc/XDV5 
-8SAM]. Tennessee subsequently amended the Tennessee Heritage Protection Act to prevent 
this style of work-around. 
15. Complaint, In re Descendants of Nathan Bedford Forrest, THC Administrative Docket Num-
ber: 04.47-150937J (April 5, 2018), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/environment
/boards/documents/Amended_Petition_Rcvd_by_THC_4_5_18.pdf [https://perma.cc
/AQ4S-YU7X]. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 170-176. 
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its two major academic camps, cultural nationalism and cultural international-
ism. Nowhere does cultural-property law consider the value of destruction, a 
problem that the issues surrounding Confederate memorials makes clear. 
A. Cultural-Heritage Law in Practice 
Cultural-property law has antecedents dating back at least to the Renais-
sance,
17
 but the modern law began to emerge in the aftermath of World War II.
18
 
This law has developed as a series of ad hoc responses to widely deplored acts of 
destruction. The international treaty law governing cultural property arose as a 
response to the unprecedented destruction and looting of historical objects that 
occurred during the war. Similarly, the customary international law of cultural 
heritage has emerged as a response to acts of cultural destruction condemned by 
the international community, including, most signiﬁcantly, the Taliban’s 2001 
bombings of the Bamiyan Buddhas and the destruction of numerous sites of re-
ligious and historical signiﬁcance during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. 
Domestically, cultural-property law has similar preservationist roots. The 
most important piece of federal legislation governing cultural property, the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), was passed as the result of activism 
following the destruction of the original Penn Station in New York City in 
1961.
19
 And recently, the movement to remove or destroy Confederate monu-
ments has led to a wave of state-level cultural-heritage laws that prevent munic-
ipalities from altering, removing, or destroying objects of historical signiﬁcance. 
This Section reviews these historical events in detail, beginning with the inter-
national law of cultural property and then moving to U.S.-speciﬁc protections. 
1. International Cultural-Property Law 
The international law governing cultural property consists of multilateral 
treaties and customary international law. Because these have all emerged as the 
result of condemned acts or waves of destruction, they tend to prize cultural 
preservation above all else. 
 
17. See Gael M. Graham, Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property: Issues of Deﬁnition and Justi-
ﬁcation, 21 INT’L L. 755, 756-57 (1987). 
18. PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 544-
45 (3d ed. 2012). 
19. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
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a. Treaties 
The ﬁrst major modern cultural-heritage treaty was the Hague Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conﬂict, which 
was adopted by an intergovernmental conference of ﬁfty-six nations in 1954. 
Called “[c]ultural property’s founding document,”
20
 the Convention’s primary 
purpose was to require that nations engaged in war avoid destruction of cultur-
ally important material to the extent possible.
21
 The Convention also placed af-
ﬁrmative obligations on nations to protect cultural property within their bound-
aries during times of peace.
22
 
The Hague Convention was adopted in direct response to the “massive de-
struction and looting of cultural objects and monuments” during World War 
II.
23
 The amount of cultural-property pillage during the war vastly exceeded any 
program of appropriation in human history.
24
 The drafters of the Convention 
intended to establish principles for the protection of cultural property during 
armed conﬂict that would ensure this destruction never again occurred.
25
 
The language of the Hague Convention reﬂects its orientation toward the 
preservation of cultural property in response to the destruction wrought by 
World War II.
26
 The language of the Preamble reﬂects a value-neutral and 
preservation-oriented philosophy: “Being convinced that damage to cultural 
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural her-
itage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of 
the world,” the contracting nations “[h]ave agreed” to the Convention’s terms.
27
 
Thus, the Hague Convention assumes that preservation is a good, and that the 
 
20. Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2009 (2007). 
21. The Convention contains a possibility of waiver for “military necessity.” 1954 Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 7, art. 4 § 2. 
22. Id. art. 4. 
23. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 18, at 544. 
24. See Graham, supra note 17, at 765; Anthi Helleni Poulos, The 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conﬂict: An Historic Analysis, 28 INT’L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 1, 21 (2000) (“The dimensions and scope of German pillage in World War II 
exceeded the plunder of all the wars of European history.”). 
25. See Poulos, supra note 24, at 36-38. 
26. Patty Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conﬂict: Looking Back, Looking For-
ward, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677, 684 (2009) (“The horriﬁc experiences of 
World War II led the international community” to enact “the ﬁrst international convention to 
address exclusively the fate of cultural property during war time.”). 
27. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 7, pmbl. 
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cultural patrimony of all cultures is equally worthy of preservation because of its 
common value to all of mankind. 
The second major cultural-heritage treaty was also drafted and ratiﬁed in re-
sponse to the events of the World War II. An explosion in the illegal trade of 
cultural objects followed World War II.
28
 This increase in the black-market trade 
of antiquities led to international efforts by the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entiﬁc, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which culminated in the 1970 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
29
 The core pro-
vision of the UNESCO Convention requires that states who are party to the 
treaty prevent the importation of cultural property “whose export from another 
State Party was illegal.”
30
 
Like the Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention makes preservation 
of cultural property central to its stated mission. The Convention refers to the 
“moral obligations” of nations to “respect [their] own cultural heritage and that 
of all nations,” and the requirement that “every State . . . protect the cultural 
property existing within its territory.”
31
 Taken together, the two treaties show 
that preservation lies at the center of the international treaty regime governing 
cultural heritage. 
b. Customary International Law 
The development of the customary international law of cultural heritage has 
followed a similar pattern to the development of treaty law: the international 
community has recognized ever greater obligations on the part of states to pro-
tect their cultural property in response to various acts of destruction. Although 
customary international law does not create the same obligations as treaties, it 
nevertheless provides guidance to domestic states. Formally described, custom-
ary international law is the body of law deﬁned by the general practices of the 
states in the global community.
32
 To be a part of customary international law, 
the rule must be in common usage and there must be a general opinion that the 
 
28. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 18, at 649. 
29. Id. at 649, 987; see United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural Organization, Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO 
Convention]. 
30. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 18, at 649. 
31. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, pmbl. 
32. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 933 (deﬁning customary international law as “a general practice accepted as law”). 
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practice is “required, prohibited or allowed . . . as a matter of law.”
33
 While cus-
tomary international law is not binding in a formal sense, it serves to guide na-
tions in their development of domestic cultural-heritage protections. 
Two events in particular led to expansions in the customary international law 
protections for cultural heritage—ﬁrst, the destruction of sites of religious and 
historical signiﬁcance during the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s; and second, the 
bombing of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001. Although the Yugoslav 
Wars and the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas did not result in any addi-
tional treaty commitments, the international reaction to these events form the 
baseline to which countries respond when considering their own cultural-prop-
erty laws. 
i. Yugoslavia 
The civil war in Yugoslavia saw the destruction of sites of major historical 
and archaeological importance. Combatants in the Yugoslav Wars deliberately 
targeted cultural property as part of a program of ethnic cleansing.
34
 Bosnian 
Serbs demolished hundreds of mosques, churches, and cultural sites.
35
 Federal 
troops also destroyed a number of sites of historical signiﬁcance in Dubrovnik, 
including the city center, a UNESCO World Heritage site.
36
 
During the war, the U.N. Security Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). After the hostilities ended, 
the ICTY rendered several convictions for the desecration of the nation’s cultural 
past. In Prosecutor v. Kordić, the ICTY held that deliberate destruction of the cul-
tural property of a “particular political, racial or religious group[]” constituted a 
 
33. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to 
the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conﬂict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
175, 178 (2005). 
34. See, e.g., Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conﬂict: The Prac-
tice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 1 
(2001) (arguing that during the Yugoslav Wars “belligerents . . . tried to obtain psychological 
advantage by directly attacking the enemy’s cultural property without the justiﬁcation of mil-
itary necessity”). 
35. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fishman, Locating the International Interest in Intranational Cultural Property 
Disputes, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 347, 359-60 (2010). For a comprehensive enumeration of the most 
egregious examples of deliberate destruction of cultural property, see Karen J. Detling, Eternal 
Silence: The Destruction of Cultural Property in Yugoslavia, 17 MD. J. INT’L L. 41, 66-67 (1993). 
36. Abtahi, supra note 34, at 1. 
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crime against humanity under the ICTY statute.
37
 The ICTY recognized that 
cultural property of special importance to nonstate groups needed protection 
from state actions even outside of the context of international armed conﬂict.
38
 
The ICTY also determined that the willful destruction of cultural property qual-
iﬁed as a criminal violation of customary international law.
39
 In Prosecutor v. 
Jokić, the ICTY held that “the crime of destruction or wilful [sic] damage done 
to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, and the arts and sciences, 
and to historical monuments and works of art and science . . . represents a vio-
lation of the values especially protected by the international community.”
40
 
These cases established that customary international law would not countenance 
the destruction of cultural property, even in an entirely civil conﬂict. 
The decisions of the ICTY represented an important development in the in-
ternational law protecting cultural property. While earlier treaty regimes had 
placed obligations on nations to take reasonable steps to protect cultural prop-
erty in international armed conﬂicts, the ICTY’s decisions recognized for the ﬁrst 
time an obligation to protect cultural property in intranational disputes. Further, 
by linking cultural property to the human rights of particular groups, the ICTY 





In early 2001, to the shock of the international community, the Taliban began 
to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan.
42
 These massive statues were carved into 
sandstone cliffs in the Bamiyan Valley sometime between the third and sixth 
 
37. Fishman, supra note 35, at 360; Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 207 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases 
/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LCD-U4N6]. 
38. Id. ¶ 360. 
39. Id. ¶ 206. 
40. Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Judgment, ¶ 46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok 
-sj040318e.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA6H-QFRA]. 
41. See Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage and International Law, in 
MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2004 INTERNATIONAL LAW SESSION 377, 391 
(Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2007) (noting that the ICTY’s “jurisprudence reiterates the link increas-
ingly being recognized in international law between cultural heritage and the enjoyment by a 
group or community of their human rights”). 
42. Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and In-
ternational Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 625 (2003). 




 The two statues stood 174 feet and 118 feet tall, placing them 
among the largest Buddhist icons in the world.
44
 On February 27, the Taliban 
ordered the destruction of all statues of any kind in the country, pursuant to the 
Islamic prohibition on idols.
45
 In spite of an international outcry, including of-
fers from assorted nations to remove the Buddhas,
46
 the Taliban promptly began 
destruction operations.
47




The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas led to discussions of whether de-
struction of domestic cultural property could violate international law. Interna-
tional law had not previously considered the question of whether governments 
could destroy their own cultural property, focusing its attention instead on the 
protection of heritage during war.
49
 Some international law scholars argued that 
the bombing nonetheless violated customary international law.
50
 In the imme-
diate aftermath of the bombings, however, the status of the attacks under inter-
national law was unclear. 
Setting aside whether the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas was a viola-
tion of international law at the time the Taliban executed it, the international 
community moved to render similar future actions illegal. In response to the 
 
43. Id. 
44. Agence France-Presse, Pre-Islam Idols Being Broken Under Decree by Afghans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
2, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/02/world/pre-islam-idols-being-broken 
-under-decree-by-afghans.html [https://perma.cc/X2UW-CHT2]. The original Buddhist 
community that built the statues was driven out of the area by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth 
century. Joshua Hammer, Searching for Buddha in Afghanistan, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 
2010), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/searching-for-buddha-in-afghanistan 
-70733578 [https://perma.cc/F8KV-VTQ2]. The statues were thus not in use for contempo-
rary religious practice. 
45. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, Taliban Decree Orders Statues Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/27/world/taliban-decree-orders-statues 
-destroyed.html [https://perma.cc/CL3D-386Z]. 
46. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Feb. 25-March 3; Fear for Buddha Statues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/weekinreview/feb-25-march-3-fear-for 
-buddha-statues.html [https://perma.cc/V6X5-CRF6]. 
47. See Barry Bearak, Over World Protests, Taliban Are Destroying Ancient Buddhas, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/world/over-world-protests-taliban 
-are-destroying-ancient-buddhas.html [https://perma.cc/R53H-F5XQ]. 
48. See Barry Bearak, Afghan Says Destruction of Buddhas Is Complete, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/12/world/afghan-says-destruction-of-buddhas-is 
-complete.html [https://perma.cc/744W-4EVZ]. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 17-31. 
50. See, e.g., Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 42, at 628-38. 
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concern that international law would sanction the destruction of cultural prop-
erty, UNESCO adopted a “Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction 
of Cultural Heritage.”
51
 This document, expressly invoking the Bamiyan Bud-
dhas,
52
 clariﬁed that intentional destruction of cultural heritage violates interna-
tional law. According to the declaration, any nation that “intentionally destroys 
or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures to prohibit, prevent, stop, and 
punish any intentional destruction of cultural heritage . . . bears the responsibil-
ity for such destruction, to the extent provided for by international law.”
53
 
The customary international law of cultural property has thus emerged in 
response to various acts of destruction condemned by the international commu-
nity. The Yugoslav Wars resulted in the obligation of nations to protect cultural 
property in intranational armed conﬂict, while the Bamiyan destruction elevated 
destruction by a government within its own territory to the level of a violation 
of international law. In both cases, destruction of cultural property led to ex-
panded duties on nations to protect cultural heritage. 
Because the international law of cultural property has emerged in response 
to acts of destruction, its instruments are focused on preservation. Further, the 
protections it offers are applied universally, to all cultural heritage, in a value-
neutral way. As applied to the Confederate memorials, international law seems 
to require that cities leave them standing and protect them from potential dam-
age. International law offers no possible criteria for a city attempting to evaluate 
whether or not removal or destruction of a monument is appropriate. Worse 
still, international law forbids destruction, irrespective of the reasons why the 
city or its citizens object to the content of the monument. 
2. Domestic Cultural-Property Law 
Domestic cultural-property law followed a similar course. Destruction of cul-
tural property led to legislative action for historic preservation at both the state 
and federal level. Much like the international law of cultural property, domestic 
cultural-property law emerged in response to acts of destruction and recognizes 
only preservation as a legally cognizable value. 
 
51. UNESCO Res. 32 C/33, UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001331/133171e
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J6Z-SZMC]. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. art. VI. 
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a. The National Historic Preservation Act 
The most important piece of federal legislation governing cultural heritage 
in the United States is the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966.
54
 
Historic preservation efforts in the United States date back to the nineteenth 
century.
55
 Before the NHPA, however, federal support was “very modest.”
56
 The 
Act was passed in response to growing concerns that urban renewal projects were 
destroying historic and cultural landmarks in major American cities.
57
 In partic-
ular, the destruction of the old Art Deco Penn Station to make way for Madison 
Square Garden galvanized cultural-property efforts in New York and across the 
nation.
58
 These efforts accelerated through the early 1960s. 
In 1966, the U.S. Conference of Mayors produced a report, With Heritage So 
Rich, which examined the need for the preservation of historic buildings and 
districts in major U.S. cities.
59
 The report covered the destruction of many build-
 
54. 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2018). 
55. Mark P. Nevitt, The National Historic Preservation Act: Preserving History, Impacting Foreign Re-
lations?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 388, 394 (2014) (describing early efforts at historic preserva-
tion, including the protection of Mount Vernon and the battleﬁeld at Gettysburg). 
56. Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 474-75 (1981) (“[Federal support] consisted chieﬂy of the acquisition of 
a few individual park sites and ‘landmarks’ of national signiﬁcance; the protection of ‘antiq-
uities’ on federal property; a Depression-era survey of historically and architecturally signiﬁ-
cant structures; the founding of a nonproﬁt ‘National Trust’ to encourage private preserva-
tion; and the creation of an historic district in Washington’s Georgetown.” (citations 
omitted)). 
57. National Historic Preservation Act, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nps.gov
/subjects/historicpreservation/national-historic-preservation-act.htm [https://perma.cc
/A562-XNKS]. 
58. David Anthone, Old Penn Station, the Birth of Historic Preservation in New York, U.S. GEN. SER-
VICES ADMIN. (May 15, 2015), https://www.gsa.gov/blog/2015/05/15/Old-Penn-Station-the 
-Birth-of-Historic-Preservation-in-New-York [https://perma.cc/Y6CQ-9NFP] (“The 1964 
demolition of the original 1910 Penn Station sparked the city’s preservation legislation . . . . 
Out of the dust of that grand old station emerged the NYC Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission, the largest municipal preservation agency in the nation responsible for protecting 
New York’s signiﬁcant buildings and sites.”). 
59. SPECIAL COMM. ON HISTORIC PRES., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH 
130-34 (1966). 
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ings of historic interest resulting from urban renewal projects and the develop-
ment of the interstate highway system.
60
 The recommendations of the report are 
“widely regarded as the seminal work behind the [NHPA].”
61
 
The NHPA’s preamble reﬂects the value of historic preservation on which 
the statute is founded. It states: “the spirit and direction of the Nation are 
founded upon and reﬂected in its historic heritage.”
62
 Further, “the historical and 
cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our 
community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the 
American people.”
63
 NHPA thus assumes the value of preserving historical ob-
jects and preservation’s importance to fostering a sense of national and commu-
nal identity.
64
 Despite these lofty aims, the NHPA does not provide precise cri-
teria for determining what speciﬁcally deserves the protection of cultural-
heritage law other than properties of a certain age. 
NHPA includes several important provisions. It requires that federal agen-
cies report on the effects of their activities on historic properties.
65
 Its major in-
novation, however, is the vast expansion of the National Register of Historic 
Places, both in the number of properties listed and in the protections afforded to 
those properties.
66
 Listing on the Register affords protection and access to fed-
eral funds to “districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects signiﬁcant in 
American history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture.”
67
 The 
National Register predates NHPA,
68
 but the law signiﬁcantly expanded it and 
 
60. Nevitt, supra note 55, at 397; see also Rose, supra note 56, at 475 (“During the 1950s, federal, 
state, and local governments embarked on urban renewal and highway projects that chewed 
up aging neighborhoods and distinctive old buildings . . . .”). 
61. Rose, supra note 56, at 489. 
62. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(1) (2018). 
63. Id. § 470(b)(2). 
64. Rose, supra note 56, at 488-91 (reviewing ways in which community-building may be “the 
central direction of recent preservation activity”). 
65. 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2018) (previously codiﬁed at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012)). 
66. Nevitt, supra note 55, at 397, 399-403. 
67. 54 U.S.C. § 302101 (previously codiﬁed at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A) (2012)). For discussions 
of funding and protection of historic landmarks, see, for example, id. § 306109, which permits 
inclusion of “preservation activities” as “eligible project costs” for federal agencies; and id. 
§ 306102, which establishes preservation programs. 
68. The National Register was originally established by the National Historic Sites Act of 1935. 
National Historic Sites Act of 1935, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (1935) (codiﬁed as amended at 54 
U.S.C. §§ 102303-04, 320101-04, 320106). 
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the protections afforded to properties on the list.
69
 Today, the Register includes 
more than 900,000 items,
70
 a number of which are Confederate memorials.
71
 
In the ﬁve decades since its enactment, the NHPA has undoubtedly been re-
sponsible for a great deal of salutary historic preservation.
72
 However, like the 
international cultural-property treaties discussed above, the NHPA leaves central 
problems in historic preservation law unanswered. Because the loss of cultural 
property was the inciting cause for the passage of the legislation, the law values 
preservation but gives little thought to what should be preserved or whether the 
law should recognize other values aside from preservation. In fact, the National 
Park Service does not choose which properties are listed on the National Regis-
ter; instead, private individuals apply to have properties listed. Critically, the cri-
teria for listing on the National Register are framed exclusively in terms of his-
torical signiﬁcance. The criteria require that the property either be “associated 
with events that have made a signiﬁcant contribution to . . . our history,” “asso-
ciated with the lives of signiﬁcant persons,” “embody the distinctive characteris-
tics of a type, period, or method of constructions,” or “have yielded or may be 
likely to yield information important in our history.”
73
 The criteria give no con-
sideration to broader community values, nor do they contemplate the possibility 
that some structures could be simultaneously historically signiﬁcant and unwor-
thy of preservation. Because the NHPA only identiﬁes preservation as an end in 
itself without making clear the public purposes of preservation aside from vague 
appeals to historical importance, the law lacks a coherent rationale to direct 
preservation activities. 
 
69. Nevitt, supra note 55, at 399. 
70. Spreadsheet of NRHP Listed Properties, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/subjects
/nationalregister/upload/national-register-listed-20181017.xlsx. 
71. See, e.g., National Register of Historic Places Program: Caddo Parish Confederate Monument, NAT’L 
PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/feature/places/13001124.htm [https://perma.cc/S5C3 
-TYVC]; National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form, NAT’L PARK 
SERV., (Mar. 28, 1996), https://npgallery.nps.gov/NRHP/GetAsset/NRHP/64500015_text 
[https://perma.cc/GE6V-GRUE]; see also Owley & Phelps, supra note 11, at 27 n.59 (taking 
notice of at least twenty-one entries in the National Register of Historic Places Database with 
“confederate” in the title). 
72. See, e.g., Tom Mayes, The National Historic Preservation Act at 50—and Beyond, NAT’L TR. FOR 
HIST. PRESERVATION (Oct. 14, 2016), https://savingplaces.org/stories/the-national-historic 
-preservation-act-at-50-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/D2H6-A8K8] (crediting the NHPA 
with preserving, among others, the French Quarter in New Orleans and the African Burial 
Ground in New York City). 
73. National Register Criteria for Evaluation, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr 
/publications/bulletins/nrb15/nrb15_2.htm [https://perma.cc/8Z3Q-ARQV]. 
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b. State Historic Preservation Law 
The movement to remove or destroy Confederate memorials has triggered 
its own wave of legislative intervention. In recent years, states across the South 
have enacted cultural-heritage laws forbidding the removal of such monuments, 
as well as, in many cases, the renaming of buildings on state-owned property. 
To date, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Vir-
ginia, and Tennessee have each enacted some version of a cultural-heritage law.
74
 
The language of these statutes is generally neutral on its face; statutes that spe-
ciﬁcally single out Confederate memorials for protection also provide that me-
morials of other major American conﬂicts are to be protected.
75
 However, the 
connection between these statutes and the broader public debate around Con-
federate symbols is clear in many cases. For example, North Carolina passed its 
new Heritage Protection Act less than two weeks after the Confederate ﬂag was 
removed from the South Carolina State House.
76
 
The provisions of these statutes vary somewhat state to state, but the basic 
provisions are the same. They forbid the removal, alteration, or destruction of 
any monument or property owned by the state. Some of the current state laws, 
such as North Carolina’s and Tennessee’s, allow exceptions only as granted by 
the state historical commission.
77
 Others, such as South Carolina’s, allow no ex-
ceptions to the law at all.
78
 Even in states where the historical commission has 
 
74. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Local Officials Want to Remove Confederate Monuments—but States 
Won’t Let Them, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2017/08/when-local-officials-want-to-tear-down-Confederate-monuments-but-cant
/537351 [https://perma.cc/MF4A-L6MN]. 
75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-232(a) (2018) (“No architecturally signiﬁcant building, memorial 
building, memorial street, or monument which is located on public property and has been so 
situated for 40 or more years may be relocated, removed, altered, renamed, or otherwise dis-
turbed.”). 
76. Kasi E. Wahlers, North Carolina’s Heritage Protection Act: Cementing Confederate Monuments in 
North Carolina’s Landscape, 94 N.C. L. REV. 2176, 2180 (2016). 
77. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1(a) (2017) (“[A] monument, memorial, or work of art 
owned by the State may not be removed, relocated, or altered in any way without the approval 
of the North Carolina Historical Commission.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-412(b)(1), (c)(1) 
(2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no memorial regarding a historic con-
ﬂict, historic entity, historic event, historic ﬁgure, or historic organization that is, or is located 
on, public property, may be removed, renamed, relocated, altered, rededicated, or otherwise 
disturbed or altered . . . . A public entity exercising control of a memorial may petition the 
commission for a waiver of [this rule].”). 
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-165(A) (2018) (“No Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican War, 
War Between the States, Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, Korean War, 
Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War, Native American, or African-American History monuments 
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the power to grant exceptions, the historical commissions have not yet granted 
a single exception to the new heritage laws.
79
 The real purpose of the legislation 




These recent laws reﬂect the preservationist tendencies of cultural-property 
law. When cultural heritage is threatened with removal or destruction, the states 
have acted to preserve properties as they are. The effect of these laws, as critics 
have noted, is to “freeze[] the . . . landscape in time, prohibiting any municipal-
ity from permanently removing any monuments that they currently have or may 
acquire in the future, regardless of local consensus about their appropriate-
ness.”
81
 Indeed, the expansive reach of these recent laws pushes inexorably to-
ward cultural-property law’s inevitable end: the complete preservation of the ur-
ban and monumental landscape, exactly as it exists in the present. 
Thus, like the international law regime, domestic cultural-property law does 
not account for when the proprietor of cultural property might wish to remove 
its property from public display, or when it might wish to destroy it. The orien-
tation of the law is toward preserving the cultural-heritage landscape exactly as 
it is. The example of the Confederate memorials shows potential failings in this 
approach, insofar as it provides no standard by which a community might decide 
whether the removal or destruction of its cultural property might be appropriate. 
B. Cultural-Heritage Law in Theory 
Theoretical approaches to cultural-property law similarly assume that 
preservation is an unalloyed good. Cultural-heritage theorists do not generally 
discuss the value of preservation or determinative criteria for deciding what cul-
tural heritage ought to be preserved. Instead, scholarship on cultural heritage 
has tended to ask what approach will result in the greatest amount of preserva-
tion. 
 
or memorials erected on public property of the State or any of its political subdivisions may 
be relocated, removed, disturbed, or altered. No street, bridge, structure, park, preserve, re-
serve, or other public area of the State or any of its political subdivisions dedicated in memory 
of or named for any historical ﬁgure or historic event may be renamed or rededicated.”). 
79. See Tennessee Heritage Protection Act, TENN. HIST. COMMISSION, https://www.tn.gov 
/environment/about-tdec/tennessee-historical-commission/redirect---tennessee-historical 
-commission/tennessee-heritage-protection-act.html [https://perma.cc/UM88-8T5D] (list-
ing all petitions ﬁled on behalf of public entities in Tennessee requesting renaming privileges, 
none of which have been granted); see also Wahlers, supra note 76, at 2186-87 (arguing that 
the delegation of power to the commission in North Carolina is a “hollow façade”). 
80. Wahlers, supra note 76, at 2186. 
81. Id. at 2191. 
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Following a well-known article by John Merryman, the two major compet-
ing theoretical models in cultural-heritage law have come to be known as the 
“internationalist” and “nationalist” camps. The ﬁrst camp sees cultural property 
as the shared patrimony of humankind.
82
 According to this group, no nation or 
culture has any greater interest than any other nation or culture in any speciﬁc 
piece of cultural property.
83
 The second camp sees cultural property “as part of a 
national cultural heritage.”
84
 According to this view, nations have a “special in-
terest” in cultural property produced within their borders.
85
 Merryman’s typol-
ogy has become popular for speaking about theoretical justiﬁcations for cultural-




Despite their many differences, both approaches assume the value of preser-
vation. Cultural nationalism grounds itself in a logic of preservation: part of the 
reason for allowing source nations to retain cultural property within their bor-
ders and to demand repatriation of property from other nations is that the source 
nations will better protect the property.
87
 Cultural nationalists also believe that 
laws banning the export of cultural property from source nations help protect 
against the looting of archaeological sites, thus protecting against the loss of 
knowledge that can be gained from the stratigraphy of the site. 
Cultural internationalists take an approach that is even more relentlessly ori-
ented toward preservation. The cultural internationalist approach, long associ-
ated with the United States in particular, has advocated for free international 
trade in cultural products as the superior method for preserving and studying 
 
82. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831 
(1986). 
83. Id. at 831-32. 
84. Id. at 832. 
85. Id. 
86. See, e.g., Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal 
of the Antiques Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 694 (2008) (“At one end are those 
who believe that everyone has a shared interest in and claim to the common heritage of hu-
manity and that this sharing is best achieved through a vibrant and legal trade in cultural 
materials. On the other end are those who believe that the heritage of humanity is best secured 
through the recognition that cultural objects have special signiﬁcance for speciﬁc groups . . . . 
In the literature, these two sides have become known respectively as ‘cultural internationalist’ 
and ‘cultural nationalist,’ representing the ‘Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property’ 
originally deﬁned by legal scholar John Henry [Merryman]”). 
87. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 82, at 844 (“[T]he dialogue [of cultural nationalism] is about 
‘protection’ of cultural property—i.e., protection against removal.”). 




 Cultural internationalism has historically defended universal museums, 
such as the British Museum and the Louvre, which contain a great deal of herit-
age from many regions of the earth, against the demands of postcolonial nations 
for the return of their cultural property. According to one prominent interna-
tionalist, the ﬁrst priority in cultural policy should be “the preservation of the 
world’s cultural legacy, object by object if necessary.”
89
 Critics of international-
ism claim that internationalists’ free-market approach to cultural property—in 
which property can be bought and sold on international markets—will lead to a 
tremendous concentration of the world’s cultural heritage in the West. In re-
sponse, internationalists argue against these concerns in light of the fact that 
Western museums are better equipped to protect cultural property because of 
their superior resources and ethos of stewardship.
90
 
In sum, even the theoretical underpinnings of cultural-property law do not—
indeed cannot—contemplate the justiﬁable destruction of cultural property. 
Whether under a nationalist or internationalist analysis, preservation is the rai-
son d’etre of cultural-property law. Indeed, Merryman in his seminal article de-
clared the core values of cultural-property law to be “preservation, access, and 
truth.”
91
 It is thus no surprise that the existing legal apparatus around cultural 
property—both in actual law and in theory—fails to consider whether cultural 
property could be permissibly destroyed, let alone when. 
i i .  cultural property and the value of destruction 
If preservation of cultural property were always a desirable end, the status 
quo of cultural-property law would be acceptable. This Part argues that it is not: 
the destruction of cultural property can serve powerful expressive, cathartic, and 
practical interests that are unrealizable by preservation alone. 
 
88. Id. at 846 (coining the terms “cultural nationalist” and “cultural internationalist,” and arguing 
that the cultural internationalist approach is superior). 
89. James Cuno, The Whole World’s Treasures, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2001, at E7. 
90. See, e.g., Neil MacGregor, To Shape the Citizens of “That Great City, the World,” in WHOSE CUL-
TURE?: THE PROMISE OF MUSEUMS AND THE DEBATE OVER ANTIQUITIES 39, 43 (James Cuno 
ed., 2009). For a critique of MacGregor’s view, see Salome Kiwara-Wilson, Restituting Colonial 
Plunder: The Case for the Benin Bronzes and Ivories, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
L. 375, 398-99 (2013). 
91. John Henry Merryman, The Nation and the Object, 3 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 61, 64-65 (1994). 
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A. The Expressive Value of Cultural-Property Destruction 
The act of destroying cultural property has signiﬁcant expressive power. De-
stroying art or cultural property provides the individual or group carrying out 
the destruction the opportunity to violently repudiate the message or content of 
the property in question.
92
 Further, the destruction of cultural property can be 
an “effective means for communicating ideas and grabbing others’ attention.”
93
 
Destruction of cultural property has a way of generating headlines globally and 
of creating lasting cultural memories in the collective consciousness. In certain 
cases, the power of the statement sent through the destruction can outweigh the 
value of preserving the work itself.
94
 
One type of expressive destruction is a people’s collective rejection of dis-
graced political officials—a collective action of ancient pedigree. For example, the 
Roman period saw the so-called damnatio memoriae, or “dishonoring of the 
memory,” of tyrannical emperors after their deaths, which included statues being 
torn down and names being struck from buildings and public monuments.
95
 
These practices continued in the Italian Renaissance, when the citizens of Flor-
ence “burned down villas owned by the exiled Salviati and Medici families.”
96
 In 
America, the signing of the Declaration of Independence was accompanied by 
the destruction of a number of statues and paintings of the British monarch, 
including the tearing down and marching through the streets of New York of a 
 
92. See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 280 (2009) (noting that, in the 
context of Confederate memorials, “there is a public interest in destroying the monument to 
symbolically repudiate the racist past”). 
93. Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 824 (connecting the right to destroy property to First Amend-
ment values). 
94. For a similar argument as applied to creative artwork, see Adler, supra note 92, at 279-83. Adler 
argues that modiﬁcation and destruction of unique works of art may “reﬂect the essence of 
contemporary-art making.” Id. at 279. She points to the power of creative works, such as Rob-
ert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing, and Jake and Dinos Chapman’s Insult to Injury, 
which was created by defacing a series of famous Francisco de Goya prints. Id. at 280-83. 
95. Damnatio Memoriae, in 4 BRILL’S NEW PAULY 60, 60-61 (Hubert Cancik & Helmuth Schneider 
eds., 2010). See generally HARRIET I. FLOWER, THE ART OF FORGETTING: DISGRACE AND OBLIV-
ION IN ROMAN POLITICAL CULTURE (2006) (describing these acts of destruction). 
96. Tracy E. Robey, “Damnatio Memoriae”: The Rebirth of Condemnation of Memory in Renaissance 
Florence, 36 RENAISSANCE & REFORMATION 5, 5 (2013). 
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statue of King George III at Bowling Green.
97
 The statue was shipped to Newark 
to be melted down for bullets.
98
 
Next, many of the most potent political symbols of recent decades have in-
volved the destruction of cultural property in the context of regime change.
99
 
Take, for instance, the fall of the Berlin Wall. The destruction of the Berlin Wall 
by civilian East and West Germans is the most lasting symbol of the fall of com-
munism in the Eastern Bloc. The fall of communism was also accompanied by 
the destruction of hundreds of statues of Vladimir Lenin that stood throughout 
the various Soviet states. In Ukraine alone, an estimated 5,500 statues of Lenin 
were standing in 1991.
100
 Thousands were destroyed in the aftermath of Ukrain-
ian independence, and today none remain standing.
101
 As a more recent exam-
ple, the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad offers a lasting image 
of the early days of the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.
102
 
That destruction can uniquely convey some ideas is not foreign to American 
jurisprudence. On the contrary, First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that 
certain ideas are expressed in a unique way through destruction—and that such 
expression is so important that it is worth constitutionally protecting. In land-
mark cases, the Supreme Court has protected ﬂag burning and cross burning 
because of the particular expressive effect that destroying symbols can achieve. 
 
97. ISAAC BANGS, JOURNAL OF LIEUTENANT ISAAC BANGS: APRIL 1 TO JULY 29, 1776, at 57 (Edward 
Bangs ed., Cambridge, John Wilson & Son 1890) (1776), https://archive.org/details 
/journaloﬂieuten00bang/page/56 [https://perma.cc/266H-N2DD]. 
98. Id. (“The Lead, we hear, is to be run up into Musquet Balls for the use of the Yankies, when 
it is hoped that the Emanations of the Leaden George will make as deep impressions in the 
Bodies of some of his red Coated & Torie Subjects, & that they will do the same execution in 
poisoning & destroying them, as the superabundant Emanations of the Folly & pretended 
Goodness of the real George have made upon their Minds, which have effectually poisoned & 
destroyed their Souls, that they are not worthy to be ranked with any Beings who have any 
Pretensions to the Principles of Virtue & Justice.”). 
99. See Adler, supra note 92, at 280. 
100. Jordan G. Teicher, What Happened to Ukraine’s 5,500 Lenin Statues?, N.Y. TIMES: LENS (July 
17, 2017), https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/what-happened-to-ukraines-5500 
-lenin-statues [https://perma.cc/N7CP-XM78]. 
101. Id. A ﬁnal wave of Lenin-statue destruction occurred during the Euromaidan political crisis of 
2013, when opponents of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych smashed Lenin statues across 
the country. Id. (describing a scene in 2013 when protestors “slam[med] cudgels and sledge-
hammers on [a] statue’s hardy red quartzite”). 
102. Stephen Farrell, Firdos Square’s Symbols: Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES: WAR (Dec. 11, 2008), 
https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/photographers-journal-ﬁrdos-squares 
-symbols-then-and-now [https://perma.cc/8HRC-2XBQ] (“The toppling of Saddam Hus-
sein’s statue in the square that afternoon—at the time probably the most potent television and 
newspaper image since Sept. 11—was seen across the world.”).  
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In Texas v. Johnson, the Court held that the politically charged act of ﬂag burning 
deserved constitutional protection in part because of the serious offense that the 
burning was intended to cause.
103
 And in Virginia v. Black, the Court struck 
down a ban on cross burning in part because “[i]ndividuals burn crosses as op-
posed to other means of communication because cross burning carries a message 
in an effective and dramatic manner.”
104
 In both cases, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the potent expressive power of destruction, and accorded it protection 
under the First Amendment. 
The decisions in Johnson and Black differ from the destruction of cultural 
property, because in both cases the destruction was of a symbol rather than of a 
piece of cultural property. Nonetheless, the principles underlying the decisions 
extend to the destruction of cultural heritage. Under the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the very fact that the destructive act was intended to 
cause such shock may, in some cases, militate in favor of its constitutional pro-
tection. Some critics have argued that the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA),
105
 
which prohibits the destruction of an artist’s work “of recognized stature” dur-
ing his or her lifetime,
106
 is unconstitutional for precisely these reasons.
107
 Ac-
cording to such critics, there is no principled reason why the artist’s expression 
through creation should be granted any higher constitutional protection than 
the art owner’s expression through destruction.
108
 This is not necessarily to sug-
 
103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) (“Johnson was prosecuted because he knew that 
his politically charged expression would cause ‘serious offense.’ If he had burned the ﬂag as a 
means of disposing of it because it was dirty or torn, he would not have been convicted of ﬂag 
desecration under this Texas law.”). 
104. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
105. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2018) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the 
right . . . to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature.”). 
106. The “recognized stature” requirement is a subjective test that courts have determined by rely-
ing on testimony from members of the artistic community or by newspaper and magazine 
articles. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. 
G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (ﬁnding “37 works on long-
standing walls” to have “recognized stature by virtue of their selection . . . for these highly 
coveted spaces, as reinforced by the supportive evidence in the plaintiffs’ Folios and Vara’s 
compelling expert testimony as to their artistic merit and embrace by the artistic commu-
nity”), appeal docketed, No. 18-538 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2018). 
107. Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free Speech?, 11 
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 242-50 (1994); Eric E. Bensen, Note, The Visual Artists’ 
Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral Rights Cannot Be Protected Under the United States Constitution, 
24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127, 1138-44 (1996). 
108. VARA litigation is relatively common and attracts a measure of popular attention. See, e.g., 
Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Jury Finds 5Pointz Developer Illegally Destroyed Graffiti, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
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gest that cultural-heritage laws are unconstitutional—only that the law has rec-
ognized the expressive power of destruction in the closely connected context of 
the destruction of cultural symbols. 
Destruction of cultural property thus can be just as expressive as the creation 
or establishment of a monument. Destruction has the capacity to carry a strong 
message in a particularly visceral way. It is a sui generis form that can capture 
negative evaluation of something in a way that preservation or creation cannot. 
This expressive function could well extend to a municipality or state that 
wishes to destroy a Confederate memorial that it owns, rather than to recontex-
tualize it or to move it to a museum. Recontextualization or removal serve the 
preservationist values of cultural-property law, but at the expense of the expres-
sive value of destruction, which includes symbolic potential that the other op-
tions do not effectuate. Destruction can express extreme disavowal of the values 
that are attributed to the work in question. By destroying the statue, the com-
munity can make a statement that the monument is no longer expressive of the 
community’s values. 
The destruction of cultural property by a municipality or state differs from 
destruction by an individual, insofar as it is an institution that may represent the 
inﬂuence of different stakeholders. It is often the case in Confederate memorial 
removal cases that some members of the relevant community avidly advocate 
allowing the monument to stand. However, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held, the government is entitled to speak as it wishes.
109
 The same First Amend-
ment values that underlie protections for citizens to destroy cultural symbols to 
make a political statement also support decisions by municipalities to destroy 
cultural-heritage items that they own. As will be discussed below, there are le-
gitimate questions about whose decision destruction ought to be. However, the 
current regime of cultural-property law in the United States does not even allow 
this question to be asked, forbidding the destruction of cultural property at the 
international, federal, and state levels. 
 
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/nyregion/5pointz-graffiti-jury.html 
[https://perma.cc/U5DL-NSGU]. I have not, however, identiﬁed any cases in which the con-
stitutionality of VARA has been challenged. 
109. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“[A]s a 
general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse 
a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties 
on their behalf.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (holding that 
a “government entity may exercise . . . [the] freedom to express its views”); Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (holding that government has the 
right “to speak for itself”); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor 
points of view.”). 
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B. The Cathartic Value of Cultural-Property Destruction 
The destruction of cultural heritage can also bring about a catharsis for a 
community, when the object in question has or symbolizes a particularly dis-
turbing past. Catharsis is the “purgation or puriﬁcation” of an emotional state.
110
 
The destruction of a monument that represents the harms inﬂicted upon a com-
munity can help release the traumas and pains engendered by that harm. While 
the expressive value discussed in the previous section inheres in the actor de-
stroying the cultural heritage, the cathartic value of destruction beneﬁts the com-
munity that either witnesses the act of destruction or beneﬁts from the absence 
of the cultural property. 
For example, in 1989, a group of Holocaust survivors publicly sank a boat, 
the Ostwind, that had been built at Hitler’s direction and that he had boarded a 
few times.
111
 The act was to commemorate the ﬁftieth anniversary of the so-
called “Voyage of the Damned,” the 1939 journey of the St. Louis, a liner from 
Germany carrying more than nine hundred Jewish refugees.
112
 After being re-
fused admission into Cuba, the liner’s original destination, the boat came to Mi-
ami Beach, where its passengers begged to be admitted into the United States.
113
 
After the government refused to admit them, the ship was sent back to Europe, 
where many of its passengers fell victim to the Holocaust.
114
 
Twenty-six of the St. Louis’s original passengers attended the ceremony and 
many in attendance reported feeling a profound sense of catharsis at the sinking 
of the ship.
115
 Abe Resnick, who came up with the idea of sinking the ship, 
stated: “My heart is clear; this isn’t done out of any hatred . . . . But we felt we 




The Ostwind’s destruction followed attempts by the American Nazi Party to 
purchase the boat for half a million dollars and to turn it into a memorial to the 
 
110. Alan Paskow, What Is Aesthetic Catharsis?, 42 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 59, 59 (1983). 
111. Jeffrey Schmalz, Boat Hitler Built Is Sunk in Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1989), https://
www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/us/boat-hitler-built-is-sunk-in-ceremony.html [https://
perma.cc/7MU9-7K2W] (“Never mind that the rumors are exaggerated and that the Ostwind 










 The owner of the Ostwind determined, however, that it would 
be “more principled” to give the boat to the Jewish community to destroy rather 
than to sell it to the Nazi group.
118
 He stated that “it was certainly better to sink 
that boat off in Miami where it would do some good for some ﬁsh to breed and 
reproduce than to put it somewhere and make a shrine for a bunch of skinhead 
Nazis. In America we don’t believe in that kind of stuff.”
119
 While some at the 
time argued that the boat should be preserved for its (disputed) historical im-
portance, the Holocaust survivors undoubtedly derived personal beneﬁt from 
the act of the boat’s destruction. After the sinking of the ship, they could rest 
assured knowing that it would never serve as a memorial to genocidal values. 
Reactions to Confederate memorial removals suggest that cathartic values 
are served when such memorials come down. When Confederate memorials 
have come down recently, they have attracted large crowds, many of whom de-
scribe it as an important personal moment. Many in New Orleans, for example, 
described a sense of relief at the removal of four monuments to Confederate 
leaders last year.
120
 When the Forrest statue in Memphis came down, one on-
looker reported: “This is something that happens once in a lifetime. When I 
heard the news, I was like, I want to be a part of this. I want to see with my own 




Cathartic value could be served in some cases involving Confederate memo-
rials. In places with histories of racial discrimination and abuse, the destruction 
of a monument has the potential to relieve the pains of the region’s history. By 
effacing the monument from the landscape, the afflicted community is given the 
opportunity to move forward. 
 
117. Transcript: Episode 189: Hitler’s Yacht, THIS AM. LIFE (July 13, 2001), https://www 
.thisamericanlife.org/189/transcript [https://perma.cc/8XXU-CLPY] [hereinafter Hitler’s 
Yacht]. 
118. Schmalz, supra note 111. 
119. Hitler’s Yacht, supra note 117. 
120. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Tempers Flare over Removal of Confederate Statues in New Orleans, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/us/new-orleans 
-monuments.html [https://perma.cc/G8DF-ZEPP] (“Wesley Lynch III . . . spoke, with pas-
sion and despair, about the statues not as relics, but as living symbols of a social order that, 
from his experience, wanted people like him to rise only so far.”). 
121. Ryan Poe, Memphis Removes Confederate Statues from Downtown Parks, COM. APPEAL (Dec. 20, 
2017, 6:03 PM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/government/city/2017/12
/20/memphis-council-votes-immediately-remove-confederate-statues/960707001 [https://
perma.cc/NQB5-5HQZ]. 
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C. The Practical Value of Destruction 
There may also be practical reasons why a community would decide to de-
stroy cultural property. The most common alternative to destruction suggested 
for Confederate memorials, for example, is removal to museum spaces. How-
ever, maintaining the memorials in museum spaces is not costless. Many Con-
federate memorials are large structures whose storage, preservation, and mainte-
nance can be rather expensive. This was the conclusion of a government working 
group in Virginia, which assumed that monuments ought to be preserved but 
pointed out that removal to museums would not be practical in many cases be-
cause of the associated costs.
122
 For example, the University of Texas recently 
removed its statue of Jefferson Davis from its south quadrangle to its American 
history museum.
123
 The university set the statue in an exhibition, including in-
formation about the man who commissioned it, the artist, and the controversy 
surrounding the statue. Although public ﬁgures are not available, the exhibition 
was far from costless and came at a time when Texas universities were facing 
serious budget shortfalls.
124
 When the university removed additional Confeder-
ate statues from the school’s South Mall in the summer of 2017, the university 
announced that they would not join the Davis exhibit in the museum due to 
“space and expense practicality issues.”
125
 
One curiosity of cultural-property law’s preservationist orientation is that it 
would countenance options that have the same effect as destruction. For exam-
ple, cultural-property law would almost certainly permit a municipality to keep 
its Confederate memorials in a storage space to which no member of the public 
 
122. GOVERNOR MCAULIFFE’S MONUMENTS WORK GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY 
ENGAGEMENT REGARDING CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS 5-6 (2016) (“[I]f discussions arise re-
garding the removal of a monument, its long-term care and appropriate curation as a museum 
artifact at a qualiﬁed facility must be considered. It was noted that, given the potential for 
considerable costs and limited funds at the local level, localities may focus on options other 
than removal.”). 
123. Rick Jervis, When a Bronze Confederate Needed to Retire, University of Texas Found a Home, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/08/18/Confederate 
-statue-retirement-home/580041001 [https://perma.cc/NQV8-6ZS3]. 
124. See, e.g., R.G. Ratcliffe, Senate Budget Slams Texas’s Colleges and Universities, TEX. MONTHLY 
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.texasmonthly.com/burka-blog/senate-budget-slams-texass 
-colleges-universities [https://perma.cc/3W5B-B786]. 
125. Brooke Sjoberg, Jefferson Davis Statue to Stand Alone in Briscoe Center, DAILY TEXAN (Oct. 26, 
2017), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2017/10/26/jefferson-davis-statue-to-stand-alone
-in-briscoe-center [https://perma.cc/5KUB-95D3]. 
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had access, so long as it maintained the memorials.
126
 The memorials would be 
removed from public sight, but would still exist. This option looks like destruc-
tion from the perspective of the public, but still requires that the public pay to 
preserve the cultural heritage. Destruction may be preferable to hidden storage 
for simple economic reasons. 
None of this is to say that destruction is always better than preservation. 
Preservation is often a laudatory goal and serves important aims, such as the 
preservation of history and of aesthetically signiﬁcant works. However, as dis-
cussed above, the legal framework surrounding cultural property has not taken 
into account the fact that destruction can also serve important aims. But destruc-
tion of cultural property must be undertaken with care because, once done, it 
cannot be undone. In the next section, I argue for a limited exception to the pro-
tections of cultural-property law for a particular class of cultural heritage that 
may be amenable to destruction. 
i i i .  a human rights-based approach 
The preceding Parts argued that the destruction of some cultural property 
like Confederate monuments may serve important ends. These monuments, 
however, are protected by both international and domestic cultural-property law. 
In this ﬁnal Part, I suggest an alternative theory that could offer a defense of 
cultural-property destruction. Under this theory, monuments erected in com-
memoration of violations of the customary international law of human rights 
should be exempted from the strictures of cultural-property law when the gov-
ernment that owns them wishes to destroy them. This limited exception could 
countenance the destruction of Confederate memorials, while providing a prin-
cipled theoretical and legal foundation for opposing and combating acts such as 
ISIS’s destruction of Palmyra. This approach ensures that nations have the right 
to destroy their own cultural property only in cases when it is in both the national 
and the international interest. 
 
126. For a discussion of the related possibility of removing the public art of living artists under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, see John Barlow, Unringing the Bell: Publicly Funded Art and the Gov-
ernment Speech Doctrine, 34 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 67, 104 (2014) (“The concept that publicly 
funded, publicly displayed art can be regulated via the Government Speech Doctrine is im-
proper not only because of the nature of art speech but also because of the moral rights of an 
artist. This concept arises from the idea that public art should remain on public display be-
cause of an artist’s right of integrity and the ill-deﬁned scopes of both moral rights and the 
Government Speech Doctrine encourages wasteful litigation when public art is removed from 
public display.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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A. Cultural-Property Law as Human Rights Law 
The developing international law of cultural property increasingly recog-
nizes the deliberate destruction of cultural property as a violation of international 
humanitarian law.
127
 The international law of cultural heritage has come to rec-
ognize a connection to “human rights, and in particular with the collective di-
mension of the right to access, perform and maintain a group’s culture.”
128
 Many 
attacks against cultural property are intended to attack the collective identity of 
cultural groups, in order to demoralize them or efface their legacy as an individ-
ual culture. Destruction of cultural property also deprives the world of the edu-
cational, aesthetic, and recreational value of the objects or buildings. The con-
nection between the preservation of cultural property and human rights in 
international law can be traced back at least as far as the 1954 Hague Convention, 
which spoke of “‘the cultural heritage of all mankind,’ so as to underscore its 
connection to human rights.”
129
 
Emerging international criminal law classiﬁes deliberate destruction of cul-
tural property as a human rights violation. As discussed above, the ICTY found 
that various attacks on cultural property executed during the Yugoslavian con-
ﬂict in the 1990s constituted violations of customary international law.
130
 It fur-
ther found that destruction of the cultural property of a particular religious 
group was a crime against humanity.
131
 The ICTY regarded such attacks on cul-
tural property as attacks on “the very . . . identity of a people,” and as “a nearly 
pure expression of the notion of ‘crimes against humanity,’ for all of humanity 
 
127. Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against Property or a Crime 
Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 389 (2016) (“The unifying theme 
underlying [recent] developments is the recognition that cultural heritage is closely connected 
to humanity and to human rights, as can be seen from the statements of the Prosecutor in the 
Al-Faqi prosecution. Seeing cultural heritage through the lens of human rights assists us in 
reaching a more integrated understanding of the role that cultural heritage plays in the lives 
of human beings—the local community that lives among the heritage, the regional and na-
tional communities, and the world community.”); see also Francesco Francioni, The Human 
Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 10 
(2011) (characterizing “the elevation of attacks against cultural property to the legal status of 
international crimes, especially war crimes and crimes against humanity” as one of three major 
“progressive development[s] in the law” of cultural heritage). 
128. Francioni, supra note 127, at 14. 
129. Id. at 13 (quoting Hague Convention 1954, supra note 7, pmbl.). 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41. 
131. Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor 
-tj010226e.pdf [https://perma.cc/67EF-BA2S]. 
monuments to the confederacy and the right to destroy 
1159 




The Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
also recognizes destruction of cultural property as a violation of international 
humanitarian law.
133
 Article 8(2)(e)(iv) deﬁnes a war crime to include “[i]nten-
tionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion” and “historic 
monuments.”
134
 In 2016, in the case of Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, the ICC rendered 
its ﬁrst conviction for the war crime of intentional destruction of cultural prop-
erty.
135
 The Court convicted Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, who was the leader of 
Hesbah, the “morality brigade” of Ansar Dine, an ISIS-affiliated jihadist group 
in Mali.
136
 Al Mahdi was charged with directing attacks on nine mausoleums and 
one mosque in Timbuktu.
137
 Al Mahdi had been present for all ten attacks, and 
video evidence showed that he had participated himself in at least ﬁve of them.
138
 
Nine of the ten sites were UNESCO-protected World Heritage Sites, a fact 
known to Al Mahdi,
139
 who publicly referred to “[t]hose UNESCO jackasses,” 
during the destruction of the Djingareyber Mosque.
140
 Like the ICTY, the ICC 




The case law of the ICC and the ICTY show an increasing recognition that 
the law governing the preservation of cultural property is a branch of human 
rights law. According to the ICTY, destruction of cultural property represents a 
 
132. Id. 
133. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; 
id. art. 8. 
134. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(iv). 
135. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF [https://perma.cc/RS4Z-P54C]; see 
also Recent Case, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC 01/12-01/15, Judgment 
& Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1978, 1978-79 (2017) (criticizing the decision 
for failing “to deﬁne the scope of the Rome Statute’s protection for cultural heritage more 
broadly, or alternatively to sound the alarm regarding certain inadequacies in its coverage”). 
136. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, ¶¶ 31-33, 53. 
137. Id. ¶¶ 10, 45. 
138. Recent Case, supra note 135, at 1982. 
139. Id. at 1981. 
140. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15 ¶ 46 (“[A]s Mr Al Mahdi said himself during the Djingareyber 
Mosque attack: It’s probably the oldest mosque here in town, and is considered a heritage 
site . . . a World Heritage Site. There are so many rumours relating to these shrines . . . . Those 
UNESCO jackasses . . . they think that this is heritage. Does ‘heritage’ include worshipping 
cows and trees?”). 
141. Id. ¶ 15. 
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violation of humanitarian law both on nationalist and internationalist axes. It 
violates the rights of the culture to which the property belongs by irrecoverably 
destroying a component part of it; simultaneously, it degrades the human race 
by depriving it of something unique and irretrievable. 
The 2003 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of 
Cultural Heritage, issued in the wake of the destruction of the Bamiyan Bud-
dhas, also connects the national obligation to preserve cultural property to hu-
man rights law. This document expressly links cultural property to “human dig-
nity and human rights” and requires states to take action “to prevent, avoid, stop 
and suppress acts of intentional destruction of cultural heritage.”
142
 Thus, the 
Declaration, which is binding on the United States, also recognizes the preser-
vation of cultural property as a component of human rights law.
143
 The trend 
toward recognizing cultural-property destruction as an arm of human rights law 
has continued with attempts to address the ongoing destruction of cultural prop-
erty currently being carried out by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In 2017, the United 
Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2347, condemning 
ISIS’s continuing destruction of cultural property and indicating that their be-
havior likely constituted war crimes.
144
 
Viewing cultural-property law as an arm of human rights law suggests, how-
ever, that the protection of some objects even of substantial antiquity do not 
serve the law’s underlying aims. If, as one recent U.N. Report noted, “[c]ultural 
heritage is to be understood as the resources enabling the cultural identiﬁcation 
and development processes of individuals and groups which they, implicitly or 
explicitly, wish to transmit to future generations,”
145
 then it seems questionable 
that cultural property’s protections should extend to structures erected to impose 
upon or degrade some group of people. If cultural-heritage protections are in-
 
142. UNESCO Res. 32 C/33, supra note 51. While the 2003 Declaration does not contain any en-
forcement mechanism, the Declaration nevertheless obligates the United States to care for 
cultural property located within its borders and to see that it is not destroyed. 
143. Francioni, supra note 127, at 13 (stating that the principle of a connection between human 
rights and cultural heritage was “given further legal strength and scope by the adoption [of 
the Declaration]”). 
144. S.C. Res. 2347, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24, 2017) (stating that the Council “[d]eplores and condemns the 
destruction of cultural heritage, inter alia destruction of religious sites and artefacts”). 
145. Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/59, 11 (Feb. 3, 2016), http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CulturalRights/A-HRC-31-59_en.doc [https://perma
.cc/JHP5-7ZWY]. 
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deed about a people’s “ancestral connection to place”
146
 and if cultural-heritage 
destruction is really a “crime against people, not simply a loss of property,” what 




There is, thus, a tension between the underlying rationale behind cultural-
property law and at least some of the cultural property to which it extends its 
protections. In the following section, I argue that the special protections con-
ferred by cultural-property law should not extend to cultural heritage set up to 
commemorate violations of the customary international law of human rights. 
This limited exception would allow communities to decide for themselves 
whether to preserve or destroy cultural property that does not serve the under-
lying purposes of cultural-property law’s protections. 
B. A Human Rights-Based Approach to Cultural-Property Destruction 
1. A Limited Exception to Cultural Preservation Law 
A nation or other cultural proprietor who wishes to destroy cultural heritage 
should be permitted to do so only if the object was erected in celebration or com-
memoration of an act or ideology in violation of the law of nations. Using the 
customary international law of human rights has the advantage of limiting the 
number of circumstances when a monument would be exempt from the protec-
tions of cultural-heritage law, while leaving preservation rules intact for most 
cultural property. 
There is no deﬁnitive list of human rights violations. However, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that courts are competent to ascertain what qualiﬁes in the 
case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
148
 Sosa concerned the 1789 Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), which allows recovery for torts “committed in violation of the law of na-
tions.”
149
 The Court held that the ATS was enacted to create jurisdiction over “a 
relatively modest set of actions,”
150
 and with “the understanding that the com-
mon law would provide a cause of action.”
151
 The Court clariﬁed that the statute 
 
146. Gerstenblith, supra note 127, at 393 (quoting Kanishk Tharoor, Opinion, Life Among the Ruins, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/life 
-among-the-ruins.html [https://perma.cc/XD3N-WECQ]). 
147. Id. at 392. 
148. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
149. Id. at 697-99 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)). 
150. Id. at 720. 
151. Id. at 723. 
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allows a cause of action for violations of norms “of international character ac-
cepted by the civilized world and deﬁned with a speciﬁcity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms [i.e., violation of safe conducts, infringe-
ment of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy] we have recognized.”
152
 Since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, courts have routinely assessed whether par-
ticular acts qualify as human rights violations for purposes of ATS litigation.
153
 
One commonly used list, cited in the Sosa decision, is that of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which enumerates the following as a compre-
hensive list of ﬁrmly established human rights violations under customary inter-
national law: genocide; slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing the disap-
pearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 




Many of the Confederate monuments that dot the South would qualify as 
honoring behavior that was in violation of today’s customary international law 
of human rights—in particular, slavery and systemic racial discrimination. The 
overwhelming majority of monuments to the Confederacy were not erected in 
the immediate aftermath of the war.
155
 Instead, monument construction peaked 
in the Jim Crow era, when hundreds of monuments were erected through the 
advocacy of private groups all throughout the South.
156
 There were two major 
waves of Confederate memorial construction. A ﬁrst wave began in the late nine-
teenth century, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Fergu-
son.
157
 Erection of monuments accelerated through the 1900s, peaking in 1910 
 
152. Id. at 724-25. 
153. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
corporation’s use of child agricultural laborers who were not formally employed at its Liberian 
plant could not give rise to ATS litigation); Abdullahi v. Pﬁzer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 
2009) (holding that the ATS conferred jurisdiction over a claim that corporations engaged in 
non-consensual experimentation on human subjects); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, Ltd., 
504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the ATS conferred jurisdiction over a claim that 
corporations aided and abetted South Africa’s apartheid government). 
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987). 
155. Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy, S. POVERTY L. CTR. 11 (2017), https://www
.splcenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/com_whose_heritage.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7SA 
-D95N]. 
156. Id. (“The ﬁrst [spike] began around 1900, amid the period in which states were enacting Jim 
Crow laws to disenfranchise the newly freed African Americans and re-segregate society. This 
spike lasted well into the 1920s, a period that saw a dramatic resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan, 
which had been born in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War.”). 
157. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 




 A second, smaller wave of Confederate monument construction oc-
curred in the mid-1950s, beginning almost immediately after the Supreme 




The timing of the placement of these monuments suggests that their purpose 
was in large part to celebrate the Southern legacy of slavery, to indicate support 
for white supremacy, and to intimidate Blacks living in the area.
160
 Important 
Confederate memorials of the Jim Crow era are closely linked to the revitaliza-
tion of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the twentieth century.
161
 Stone Mountain, 
Georgia, for instance, features an immense sculpture on the scale of Mount 
Rushmore, depicting Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Jefferson Davis.
162
 
The location of this monument, completed in 1972, was chosen because it was 
the site where the second KKK was founded in 1915.
163
 Planning began within a 
year of this ignominious event, spearheaded by the Atlanta chapter of the United 
Daughters of the Confederacy.
164
 
Stone Mountain also provides strong evidence for the close link between cer-
tain Confederate memorials and systemic racial discrimination.
165
 Begun in the 
1910s in the middle of the Jim Crow era, the plans for an “eighth wonder of the 
world” were eventually abandoned amidst inﬁghting between various involved 
factions, including the KKK, the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the 
Stone Mountain Confederate Memorial Association, and Gutzon Borglum, the 
 
158. Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy, supra note 155, at 14. 
159. Id. at 15. 
160. Court Carney, The Contested Image of Nathan Bedford Forrest, 67 J.S. HIST. 601, 617 (2001) 
(discussing the connection between the 1905 establishment of the Nathan Bedford Forrest 
Monument in Memphis with “racism,” “white supremacy,” “the subtle threat of racialized 
social control,” and “[the] strict racial subordination [that] stiﬂed any expression of African 
American perceptions of the general”); Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy, supra 
note 155, at 11. 
161. Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Confederacy, supra note 155, at 13 (noting the connections 
between Stone Mountain Park’s creation and the KKK). 
162. See, e.g., Grace Elizabeth Hale, Granite Stopped Time: The Stone Mountain Memorial and the 
Representation of White Southern Identity, 82 GA. HIST. Q. 22, 22 (1998) (linking the planning 
of Stone Mountain to the election of Woodrow Wilson, the popularity of the ﬁlm The Birth of 
a Nation, and the segregation of Washington, D.C. as early twentieth-century triumphs of a 
revitalized white South). 
163. Id. at 23 
164. Id. at 25. 
165. The full story of the troubled construction of Stone Mountain is recounted in Hale, supra note 
162. 
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monument’s sculptor, who would later go on to design Mount Rushmore.
166
 
The project languished for decades, only to be revived in the 1950s in the wake 
of Brown v. Board of Education.
167
 After that decision, the Georgia state assembly 
began a program of instating symbols of the Confederacy as signs of resistance 
to the Supreme Court’s decision, including the purchase of Stone Mountain in 
order to attempt to complete the memorial.
168
 
2. Determining a Monument’s Amenability to Destruction 
One important question in evaluating whether a memorial celebrates a vio-
lation of the customary international law of human rights is whether one should 
look to the circumstances of the monument’s erection, the content of the monu-
ment, or the contemporary reception of the monument. I argue that the circum-
stances of the monument’s erection offer the best yardstick for determining 
whether the monument should be subject to a human rights exception to general 
cultural-heritage protections. 
Looking to the contemporary reception of the monument should be ruled 
out immediately. Public reactions to monuments are too varied to be reduced to 
a single contemporary reaction. The Confederate memorial debate illustrates 
this vividly. It is reasonable to accept that some defenders of Confederate memo-
rials feel a genuine attachment to them as a part of their history, rather than as 
monuments to an antidemocratic, white-supremacist ideology. On the other 
hand, as discussed above, it is also reasonable to see the memorials as celebra-
tions of systemic racial oppression. The same could be said of the Bamiyan Bud-
dhas: while much of the world saw them as treasures of the world’s cultural pat-
rimony, fundamentalist Islamists saw them as an affront to their religious values. 
The content of the monument affords a better option, but is still deﬁcient in 
several respects.
169
 The content or symbolism of a piece of cultural property may 
not directly express the ideology of the memorial. In the Southern context, mon-
uments whose purpose was to celebrate a racial ideology rarely directly depicted 
slavery. Stone Mountain is a perfect example: although the relief depicts Con-
federate leaders without any explicit reference to slavery, its purpose was surely 
to evoke the racial ideology of the Confederacy. Looking to the content of the 
 
166. Id. at 32-34, 38. 
167. Id. at 40. 
168. Id. 
169. Debates over the legacy of ﬁgures depicted in the memorials have formed the greater part of 
the popular discourse surrounding the removal of Confederate memorials. See, e.g., Eric 
Foner, The Making and the Breaking of the Legend of Robert E. Lee, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/books/review/eric-foner-robert-e-lee.html [https://
perma.cc/6PHM-2UHZ]. 
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monument will often entail a complicated and contentious evaluation of the his-
torical legacy of the ﬁgures it depicts—a task cultural-property law is ill equipped 
to manage. 
Moreover, scrutinizing content also raises thorny questions on what exactly 
the “content” of a visual representation is. Controversies over interpreting the 
legacies of historical ﬁgures illustrate the point. Much of the debate surrounding 
Confederate memorials asks whether the ﬁgures represented in the memorials 
are worthy of celebration today. For example, defenders of statues of Nathan 
Bedford Forrest argue that he ought to be commemorated for his military bril-
liance
170
 and his pleas for racial harmony late in life.
171
 Others point to his posi-
tion as the ﬁrst Grand Wizard of the KKK and his involvement in the Fort Pillow 
massacre, where Confederate soldiers murdered hundreds of black soldiers after 
they had surrendered.
172
 Forrest’s defenders argue that his involvement in the 
KKK was limited and that he quickly disavowed the organization as its involve-
ment in vigilante violence increased.
173
 These evaluative questions are not likely 
to be solved by cultural-property law. 
Looking to the circumstances of the monument’s erection allows for a deter-
mination to be made whether the monument was established in celebration of a 
violation of human rights law and, as such, whether the cultural property should 
be amenable to destruction. In the case of the Forrest example, for instance, it is 
clear that, while Forrest’s legacy is contested today, at the time that most of his 
 
170. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 160, at 604-05 (“Memphians took great pride in Forrest’s lack of 
formal military education but maintained that their hero, though untrained, instinctively 
knew the rules of battle.”). Carney also points out, however, that there is considerable reason 
for doubt about the historical accuracy of these claims of Forrest’s military prowess and claims 
regarding his importance to the Civil War. Id. at 601 (“During the Civil War, the uneducated 
general directed a number of limited victories over superior, if poorly led, Union forces. Al-
though he may not have lost a major battle, most historians agree that his handful of successes 
failed to have any real impact on the future of the Confederacy.”). 
171. See, e.g., John A. Tures, General Nathan Bedford Forrest Versus the Ku Klux Klan, HUFFPOST 
(July 6, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-tures/general-nathan-bedford-fo
_b_7734444.html [https://perma.cc/9QTV-B48F] (“[T]oward the end of his life, General 
Forrest would have likely sought to exterminate those who would kill blacks in his name . . . . 
He eventually saw the light, softened his racism, and eventually worked to destroy the 
KKK.”). 
172. See, e.g., Robbie Brown, Bust of Civil War General Stirs Anger in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
24, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/us/ﬁght-rages-in-selma-ala-over-a-civil 
-war-monument.html [https://perma.cc/TKR4-YU5G] (“[H]e was accused of war crimes 
for allowing his forces to massacre black Union troops who had surrendered after the Battle 
of Fort Pillow in Tennessee in 1864. Following the war, he joined the newly formed Ku Klux 
Klan and became its ﬁrst grand wizard.”). 
173. See Tures, supra note 171. 
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statues were erected, he was celebrated precisely for his role in human rights vi-
olations. In the early twentieth century when most of the statues of Forrest were 
erected, Forrest’s role as a founder of the KKK was understood to be signiﬁcant, 
and he was celebrated in large part because of that role.
174
 Forrest’s legacy was 
promoted during the romanticizing of the Klan that occurred in the early nine-
teenth century.
175
 In fact, turn-of-the-century accounts cast Forrest’s order to 
dissolve the Klan in the opposite light from that of his modern defenders: as an 
order only given once the Klan’s objectives had been achieved.
176
 
The use of contemporary sources will make it possible to establish the orig-
inal intended purpose of the memorial. In some cases, inscriptions or other doc-
umentation make the issue glaringly clear. For example, the recently removed 
Battle of Liberty Place Monument in New Orleans had, until the 1970s, an in-
scription reading: “United States troops took over the state government and re-
instated the usurpers but the national election of November 1876 recognized 
white supremacy in the South and gave us our state.”
177
 While the purposes be-
hind other monuments may not be as clear, the ordinary methods of historical 
research should be able to establish what a monument was intended to memori-
alize. 
If cultural property belonging to a nation is determined to have been pro-
duced in celebration of a violation of the customary international law of human 
rights, the nation in question should have the power to destroy it. Just because 
cultural property celebrates a human rights violation does not mean that it should 
be destroyed, only that international law should countenance such destruction. 
 
174. See Carney, supra note 160, at 610 (“During a period that featured some of the worst racial 
atrocities in American history, the Klan became a potent symbol of white supremacy—and in 
the midst of this resurgence of racism, Memphis chose to unveil its bronze equestrian memo-
rial to Forrest. Had Memphis constructed such a memorial in the 1880s, it likely would have 
reﬂected the postwar themes in evidence at his funeral—a naturally gifted general of strong 
religious faith who had overcome childhood poverty to become a wealthy businessman . . . . 
Instead, by 1905, the year of the Forrest statue’s dedication, increasing racial brutality . . . had 
helped to unite white Memphians and in turn transform the city’s image of Forrest.”). 
175. See, e.g., Thomas Dixon, Jr., The Story of Ku Klux Klan: Some of Its Leaders, Living and Dead, 
22 METROPOLITAN MAG. 657, 668 (1905). 
176. Id. at 668 (“The order of dissolution of the Klan as issued by General Forrest was in every 
way characteristic of the man. When the white race had redeemed six Southern States from 
Negro rule in 1870, the Grand Wizard knew that his mission was accomplished and issued at 
once his order to disband.”). 
177. JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES ACROSS AMERICA: WHAT OUR HISTORIC SITES GET WRONG 199-200 
(1999). 
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Cultural-property law should recognize that the right to destroy, “the most ex-
treme recognized property right,” vests in a government that owns cultural 
property memorializing a human rights violation.
178
 
3. Confederate Monuments and the Human Rights Approach 
Under this framework, a city that wishes to destroy a Confederate memorial 
that it owns would look to the historical circumstances of the monument’s erec-
tion and establish whether it was done in celebration of a modern violation of 
customary international law. This approach would look to contemporary inter-
national human rights norms, rather than those at the time of the erection of the 
monument. Then the city would decide whether to destroy it using normal dem-
ocratic processes. This framework allows for the vindication of the values that 
destroying cultural property can have, as discussed above. At the same time, it 
avoids the parade of horribles suggested by popular voices who advocate the 
preservation of Confederate memorials on the ground that there is no limiting 
principle to the logic of destruction. According to such critics, there is no stop-
ping point, and soon all commemorations of imperfect historical ﬁgures will 
need to be removed from public spaces.
179
 President Trump, for instance, re-
cently made this claim, remarking: “This week it’s Robert E. Lee. I noticed that 
Stonewall Jackson is coming down . . . . I wonder, is it George Washington next 
week and is it Thomas Jefferson the week after? You know, you really do have to 
ask yourself, where does it stop?”
180
 Under the framework advocated here, there 
would be a clear line beyond which the normal preservation-oriented protections 
of cultural-property law would continue to apply—namely, anything not pro-
scribed by customary international law’s limited list of human rights violations. 
 
178. Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 785. 
179. See, e.g., John Daniel Davidson, Why We Should Keep the Confederate Monuments Right Where 
They Are, FEDERALIST (Aug. 18, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/08/18/in-defense-of 
-the-monuments [https://perma.cc/AA4C-RSGD]; see also Lawrence A. Kuznar, I Detest Our 
Confederate Monuments. But They Should Remain., WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-detest-our-confederate-monuments-but-they-should 
-remain/2017/08/18/13d25fe8-843c-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html [https://perma.cc
/CY2U-VMWT] (comparing the destruction of Confederate monuments to the destruction 
of the Bamiyan Buddhas and arguing that Americans should oppose the destruction of Con-
federate monuments, not necessarily because there is no stopping point but because destruc-
tion erases our nation’s imperfect history). 
180. See, e.g., Kristine Phillips, Historians: No, Mr. President, Washington and Jefferson Are Not the 
Same as Confederate Generals, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/retropolis/wp/2017/08/16/historians-no-mr-president-washington-and-jefferson 
-are-not-the-same-as-confederate-generals [https://perma.cc/Z7HT-5FZF]. 
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One hard problem arises in the case of old or ancient cultural property that 
may run counter to the national interest. Take, for instance, the triumphal arches 
commemorating the victories of the Roman emperors. All of these arches cele-
brate victories in wars that featured actions that today would be considered war 
crimes. Several, for example, such as the Arch of Constantine in Rome, feature 
depictions of manacled slaves being taken in the aftermath of the victory.
181
 The 
Colosseum may also qualify as a monument celebrating human rights violations, 
as it was constructed for the production of gladiatorial shows and the reenact-
ment of battles, many of which included violations of the modern laws of war. It 
is possible to imagine that, at some later point, these monuments could become 
rallying points for nationalist or neofascist groups. Indeed, the restoration of 




One possible response is to look to the existing international law of cultural-
heritage protection, in particular the UNESCO World Heritage program, which, 
at least theoretically, protects sites “of outstanding universal value” that meet a 
set of selection criteria.
183
 The list includes many of the sites that would be con-
sidered among the world’s treasures, including, for instance, the entire historic 
center of Rome, which encompasses the Colosseum and the Arch of Constantine. 
One could argue that the objects on the list ought to be preserved, regardless of 
their possible commemoration of human rights abuses and of the desires of the 
nations or governmental subdivisions that own them. The UNESCO list, how-
ever, is not intended to be comprehensive and leaves outside of its compass many 
objects of historical importance. 
 
181. ALTA MACADAM & ANNABEL BARBER, BLUE GUIDE ROME 38 (11th ed. 2016). 
182. See, e.g., Aristotle Kallis, The “Third Rome” of Fascism: Demolitions and the Search for a New 
Urban Syntax, 84 J. MOD. HIST. 40, 44 (2012) (“The regime . . . endeavor[ed] to reconcile 
[conﬂicts between different branches of fascism] with and subsume them under Mussolini’s 
growing fascination with the myth of romanità, focusing on both the historical legacy and the 
physical space of Rome . . . . [The Fascist architectural project] was . . . a project in strong, 
deliberate continuity with elements and themes from the city’s history—not a ‘new’ city in 
the literal sense of the word[,] but the third iteration of the existing city, deferential to aspects 
of its history and space, seeking to ‘reclaim’ the ideal essence of its illustrious predeces-
sors . . . from the ravages of time.”); Max Page, The Roman Architecture of Mussolini, Still 
Standing, BOS. GLOBE (July 13, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/07/12/the 
-roman-architecture-mussolini-still-standing/csZ70EN2fTnUUNqX0kRM9K/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4RCD-WR6J]. See generally Jan Nelis, Constructing Fascist Identity: Benito 
Mussolini and the Myth of Romanità, 100 CLASSICAL WORLD 391 (2007) (explaining the cen-
trality of Roman history and mythology to Italian Fascism); Romke Visser, Fascist Doctrine 
and the Cult of the Romanità, 27 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 5 (1992) (same). 
183. The Criteria for Selection, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria [https://perma.cc
/D6BB-HU3B]. 
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A superior approach would be to trust nation-states to exercise their limited 
right to destroy judiciously. Because the approach advocated here merely author-
izes nations—but does not obligate them—to destroy a limited class of monu-
ments, nations would be more likely than not to continue to preserve cultural 
property that is important to national history and that generates signiﬁcant tour-
ism revenue. Although there is a clear and strong connection between the Col-
osseum or the Arch of Constantine and violations of modern human rights law, 
the national relationship of Italy to these structures is very different from the 
relationship in the United States between municipalities and their monuments 
to the Civil War. Because of these differences, it is highly unlikely that Italians 
will call for the destruction of either of these structures. 
In recent years, some federal legislation has been introduced that would 
change the status of Confederate memorials under federal law. Existing pro-
posals, however, do not promote a legal theory that validates this decision. Dur-
ing the 114th and 115th Congresses, several bills were introduced that would ad-
dress the relationship between Confederate memorials and federal funds and 
land. The most sweeping bill, the No Federal Funding for Confederate Symbols 
Act, would have prohibited the use of federal funds for the “creation, mainte-
nance, or display . . . of any Confederate symbol on . . . [any] Federal prop-
erty.”
184
 The bill takes a broad deﬁnition of “Confederate symbol,” including 
“[a]ny symbol or other signage that honors the Confederacy,” and “[a]ny mon-
ument or statue that honors a Confederate leader or soldier or the Confederate 
States of America.”
185
 There is an exception, however, for Confederate symbols 
in use in a museum or educational exhibit.
186
 
Other more modest proposals have been introduced. One bill, the Honoring 
Real Patriots Act of 2017, would require the Secretary of Defense to rename the 
ten military installations that are currently named for Confederate military lead-
ers.
187
 Another bill, H.R. 3779, would remove the monument to Robert E. Lee 
at the Antietam National Battleﬁeld and would require the removal of all statues 
of people who served in the army of the Confederate States of America from the 
National Statuary Hall.
188
 Various efforts have attempted to restrict the amount 
 
184. H.R. 3660, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017). 
185. Id. § 3(b). 
186. Id. § 3(c)(2). 
187. H.R. 3658, 115th Cong. (2017); see also LAURA B. COMAY ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R44959, 
CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS: RELATION TO FEDERAL LANDS AND PROGRAMS 3 (2017), https://fas
.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44959.pdf [https://perma.cc/995M-TP5D] (describing the Honoring 
Real Patriots Act and similar bills). 
188. H.R. 3779, 115th Cong. (2017); see also COMAY ET AL., supra note 187, at 7 (2017) (reporting 
that the bill would “require the Architect of the Capitol to arrange for the removal from the 
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of federal funding that can be used for the creation or maintenance of Confeder-
ate memorials. Thus far, none of these bills or appropriations riders have passed, 
but further attempts to pass such legislation seem likely given the political sali-
ence of the issue. 
Further federal legislation should consider the proposal advocated here. Ra-
ther than writing legislation that names particular eras in time for monuments’ 
removal, Congress should consider broader principles of what deserves federal 
protection in the cultural-heritage sphere. 
Such an approach would not be unprecedented. For example, the United 
States has refused to repatriate vast amounts of Nazi-era art and propaganda.
189
 
In doing so, it has arguably taken a version of the view that art celebrating vio-
lations of human rights is not subject to the standard law of cultural property. 
The United States took a “signiﬁcant body” of Nazi propaganda artworks during 
and after the Second World War.
190
 Although the United States has returned 
most art expropriated from Germany during World War II, it has steadfastly 
refused to return a great deal of propaganda art produced during the period.
191
 
The United States has made this decision in the face of a growing global legal 
consensus in favor of repatriation of cultural property.
192
 As Jonathan Drimmer 
has written: “The United States government has implicitly taken the position 
regarding the Nazi art that the broad and growing international legal consensus 
favoring protection and repatriation of cultural property is subject to an excep-
tion for art that helps to reinforce and instill the dominant tenets of a genocidal 
culture.”
193
 The United States steadfastly refuses to repatriate the art and, to this 




National Statuary Hall Collection of statues of persons who voluntarily served the Confeder-
ate States of America”). 
189. See Jonathan Drimmer, Hate Property: A Substantive Limitation for America’s Cultural-Property 
Laws, 65 TENN. L. REV. 691, 693-95, 712-25 (1998) (recounting the history of how the United 
States expropriated thousands of Nazi paintings and refuses to return them). 
190. Id. at 694. 
191. Id. at 695 (describing how the United States refuses to return the objects “despite lawsuits 
from original owners, pleas from the artists, and official requests by the German govern-
ment”); see also Andrew Beaujon, How a Trove of Nazi Art Wound Up Under Lock and Key on 
an Army Base in Virginia, WASHINGTONIAN (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonian.com
/2017/11/12/trove-nazi-art-wound-lock-key-army-base-virginia [https://perma.cc/5J8N 
-W4Y4] (noting that, while the United States repatriated a good deal of Nazi era art in the 
1980s, it kept 586 pieces “of the most heinous stuff” at the insistence of the Army). 
192. See Drimmer, supra note 189, at 695-96. 
193. Id. at 696. 
194. Beaujon, supra note 191 (reporting that the curator of the Army’s German art collection said 
“[t]here’s a very narrow line that we have to walk . . . because we certainly don’t want it to be 
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The United States has maintained this position through both legislative ac-
tion and litigation. In 1982, Congress passed, and President Reagan signed, a law 
requiring the repatriation of Nazi art but also requiring that all art be vetted by 
an interdepartmental committee established by the Secretary of the Army.
195
 The 
Secretary was to make sure that repatriating any of the relevant art would not be 
inconsistent with the denaziﬁcation principles of the Potsdam Protocol.
196
 The 
United States retained 586 particularly heinous pieces of art.
197
 Soon after, a col-
lector of Hitler’s art sued the government to get four of Hitler’s watercolors, 
which the government had retained.
198
 The United States took the position, both 
at the trial court and on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, that the art was being retained 
“so as to prevent [N]azism’s resurgence,” and that the decision to retain the art 
was a “highly sensitive political judgment.”
199
 Because the art contained a mes-
sage of propaganda, the Army was entitled to retain the art.
200
 The plaintiff’s suit 
was ultimately rejected on other grounds—but the approach taken by the gov-
ernment gives evidence to a belief that normal rules surrounding cultural prop-
erty ought not to apply in the case of art promoting genocide.
201
 
The framework suggested here would take a similar approach. Art and mon-
uments that celebrate or endorse actions taken in violation of the law of nations, 
such as genocide, would receive a lower degree of protection than cultural prop-
erty of any other sort. As such, Nazi-era art, to the extent that it endorsed geno-
cide—as much of it did—would not receive the same level of protection as cul-
tural properties untainted by the endorsement of human rights violations. 
conclusion 
Recent developments in the international law of cultural property have cre-
ated ever-greater obligations on nations to preserve, and not to destroy, objects 
of historic and aesthetic importance. Amid these developments, theorists have 
 
a rallying point for Nazism.”); see also id. (“[I]t’s unclear whether much of the Nazi collection 
will see the light of day. Though civilian researchers can ask for a visit, the Army is pretty 
careful about who’s allowed in, and every now and then it gets an inquiry from someone who 
raises a red ﬂag.” (quotations omitted)). 
195. Pub. L. No. 97-155, 96 Stat. 14 (1982). 
196. Id. 
197. Beaujon, supra note 191. 
198. Price v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D. Tex. 1989). 
199. Reply Brief for the Appellant/Cross-Appellee, United States of America at 28, Price v. United 
States, 69 F.3d 46 (5th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-2564). 
200. Id. (“Plaintiffs are certainly not entitled to arrogate to themselves the difficult policy judgment 
of whether Hitler watercolors could be the source of nazi resurgence.”). 
201. Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46 (5th Cir. 1995). 
the yale law journal 128:1130  2019 
1172 
failed to consider when a nation may have a legitimate interest in destroying its 
own cultural property and when that option should be legally available. The re-
cent removals of many Confederate memorials in the United States illustrate this 
problem. To the extent that cultural-property law as an arm of human rights law 
recognizes the need to preserve cultural property to protect the dignity and in-
tegrity of cultural groups, it should also recognize the need sometimes to remove 
or destroy cultural property for the beneﬁt of other groups. This permission 
must necessarily be circumscribed, lest it permit all types of cultural property to 
be destroyed. The approach advocated here, rooted in international human 
rights law, would provide a framework for considering when a culture is justiﬁed 
in destroying its own cultural property, without doing harm to the interests of 
the global community. 
